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EXEMPLARISM IN MORAL EDUCATION: PROBLEMS WITH APPLICABILITY AND 
INDOCTRINATION 
 
Michel Croce 
University of Edinburgh 
 
Forthcoming in Journal of Moral Education. Penultimate version. 
 
Abstract. This paper introduces an account of moral education grounded in Zagzebski’s recent 
Exemplarist Moral Theory and discusses two problems that have to be solved for the account to become 
a realistic alternative to other educational models on the market, namely the limited-applicability 
problem and the problem of indoctrination. The first problem raises worries about the viability of 
the account in ordinary circumstances. The second charges the proposed educational model with 
indoctrinating students. The main goal of this paper is to show how an exemplar-based account of 
moral education can handle both problems without compromising its structure and upshot. 
 
 
In her recent Exemplarist Moral Theory, Linda Zagzebski puts forth a moral theory that 
explicitly aims at being practically useful in education designed to make people moral. She 
can set this goal for the theory because it is built around something all human beings 
should in principle know and be able to experience, namely the emotion of admiration 
(2017: 3). In this paper, I introduce an account of moral education grounded in Zagzebski’s 
view and discuss two problems that have to be solved for the account to become a realistic 
alternative to other educational models on the market. The first issue can be called the 
limited-applicability problem, as it raises a concern about the viability of the account in ordinary 
circumstances. The second is the problem of indoctrination, namely a general worry about every 
account of moral education concerning whether their educational strategies turn out to 
indoctrinate students. The main goal of this paper is to show how an exemplar-based 
account of moral education can handle both problems without compromising its structure 
and upshot. Thus, after showing in section 1 how we can derive the basics of an 
educational model from Zagzebski’s exemplarist theory, in section 2 I shall discuss the 
limited-applicability problem. Section 3 is devoted to explaining how an exemplarist 
educational model can respond to the problem of indoctrination.  
 
 
1. FROM EXEMPLARIST MORAL THEORY TO AN EXEMPLAR-BASED ACCOUNT OF MORAL 
EDUCATION 
 
Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory—henceforth, EMT—is a foundationalist theory of a 
unique kind, in that its foundation does not lie in a concept but in particular individuals we 
admire because of their moral exemplarity. Applying the theory of direct reference 
proposed by Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke to the moral domain, Zagzebski identifies 
moral exemplars by direct reference to persons like that, namely individuals whom we 
admire upon reflection and we identify indexically by pointing to them. The identification 
of moral exemplars via direct reference allows Zagzebski to provide definitions of the 
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fundamental moral terms. For example, ‘a virtue is a trait we admire in an exemplar’ and ‘a 
duty in some set of circumstances C is an act an exemplar demands from both herself and 
others’ (21).i  
In her view, an important advantage of such an approach is that it avoids opening the 
doors to common forms of scepticism about the concepts grounding the theory, as 
happens, for example, with the concept of eudaimonia in neo-Aristotelian theories or with 
the concept of the good will in Kantian theories. EMT is still more appealing because it 
better suits the natural way we approach the realm of morality, where we usually are more 
certain someone is admirable ‘than we are of what is admirable about them’ (2017: 10). 
Despite Zagzebski’s remarks about the educational advantages of her theory, EMT 
does not include an exemplar-based account of moral education. Thus, in the rest of this 
section I shall develop a tool that grants the applicability of this theory to the educational 
domain, which I call the exemplarist dynamic, i.e. a process of moral development based on 
the admiration and imitation of moral exemplars according to the principles of EMT. For 
the sake of clarity, we can individuate three main stages in this dynamic: admiration, 
conscientious reflection, and emulation. 
As regards the first stage, the emotion of admiration should naturally arise before 
morally exemplary individuals and have the capacity to motivate the subject—that is, to 
lead them to act in some way—where the resulting action could range from a simple 
change of attitude towards the exemplar and the object of their deeds to a concrete 
imitation of their behaviour. Needless to say, Zagzebski is aware that things may go wrong 
in this stage as a result of the fallibility of admiration, as with any other emotion. But if this 
is the case, why should we trust our emotional dispositions? And how can we do that? 
The stage of conscientious reflection helps us address these worries. Zagzebski holds 
that it is ‘both inescapable and rational’ to naturally self-trust our emotion dispositions (44). 
It is inescapable because without self-trust in our emotion dispositions, we have no way to 
figure out whether they tend to produce fitting emotions—that is, emotions appropriately 
directed towards their intentional object (e.g., fear of a dangerous storm rather than of an 
innocuous pigeon). It is rational because in the face of the fallibility of our emotion 
dispositions, the best way to find out whether our admiration towards someone is fitting is 
to conscientiously reflect on the appropriateness of this emotion—that is, to determine 
whether our admiration for them survives reflection over time.ii 
When admiration of a moral exemplar naturally motivates us to act and our 
conscientious reflection reassures us about the rationality of our emotion dispositions, we 
thereby acquire justification for emulating the exemplar—that is, the third stage in the 
exemplarist dynamic. In Zagzebski’s vocabulary, emulating an exemplar amounts to 
imitating not only their deeds, but also their motive for acting as they do. Thus, emulating 
the exemplar is a promising way to acquire or strengthen a virtue, for it allows us to form a 
habitus—that is, to respond to morally relevant situations as an exemplar would do. 
Emulation does not require that one necessarily replicate an exemplar’s actions, for there 
might well be cases in which their deeds are well beyond our reach. Rather, emulation 
involves being able to adopt an exemplar’s attitude in the situations one finds themselves in, 
no matter whether they involve decisions with high impact on many people or actions with 
more limited consequences. 
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This brief reconstruction of the exemplarist dynamic makes it possible to propose an 
exemplar-based account of moral education. The following principles constitute the 
essential nodes of the account, which have been adapted from Croce and Vaccarezza 
(2017: 5): 
 
(i) Human flourishing is the main aim of moral education, and the acquisition of 
the virtues is a necessary condition of flourishing (Kristjánsson 2015: 14); 
(ii) Emulation of moral exemplars is the main way to achieve these aims; 
(iii) Emulation as a means of education requires the educator (a) to elicit the 
children’s admiration via presenting them with genuinely good and imitable 
models, and (b) to foster the children’s capacity for reflection upon prima facie 
admiration. 
 
Thesis (i) shows that the account is grounded on a combination of moral exemplarism and 
Aristotelian character education, where priority is assigned to aretaic notions over deontic 
ones (Steutel and Carr 1999: 7). It is worth noting that possessing the virtues is not 
sufficient for flourishing, in that achieving the ultimate aim of moral education also 
depends on further elements such as ‘good friends, family, health, basic material provisions, 
satisfactory education, and substantial supplies of “moral luck” to thrive’ (Kristjánsson 
2015: 25). Thesis (ii) illustrates the strategy through which exemplarists attempt to achieve 
the goal of moral education, thereby accounting for the stage of emulation in the 
exemplarist dynamic. Thesis (iii) sheds light on the role of the educator within an 
exemplarist perspective, thereby accounting for the other stages of the dynamic.  
Having clarified how an exemplar-based account of moral education might look, it is 
important to assess its applicability in a classroom setting. In the next section, I aim to do 
so by addressing the limited-applicability problem. 
 
 
2. THE LIMITED-APPLICABILITY PROBLEM 
 
In a recent paper on the intellectual virtue formation in the classroom, Steven Porter argues 
that the standard approach to virtue formation deploys several strategies to educate 
children to virtue, among which we list ‘(1) direct instruction on the nature and the 
importance of the virtues; (2) exposure to exemplars of the virtue; (3) practice of virtuous 
behaviours’ (2016: 222). Tanesini has raised concerns about the applicability of this 
approach in specific circumstances within the classroom. If an exemplar-based account of 
moral education is part of the standard approach to virtue formation, the account might be 
charged with the same worries. Before assessing whether this is the case, let us briefly 
explain how these strategies are supposed to work.  
Direct instruction amounts to providing children with a basic vocabulary for character 
terms—namely, what the virtues are, why they are valuable, and what allows one to 
distinguish one virtue from the others. This strategy constitutes the most controversial way 
to foster virtue formation because, in a heavy form, it could inculcate children with moral 
values without providing them with the capacity to rationally assess the values proposed 
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and with the open-mindedness required to question them. Exposure to virtuous exemplars 
is meant to show the children the virtues in action and allows them to take part in the 
exemplarist dynamic, as EMT clarifies. Finally, practicing virtuous behaviours is a delicate 
step, in that an educator is required to foster the rise of circumstances that habituate the 
children to deploying their virtuous dispositions, and thus to facilitate their emotional and 
active response to the situations without forcing them to act as a virtuous person would do.  
These concise remarks about the above strategies should suffice to explain that an 
exemplar-based account of moral education fits the standard approach to virtue formation. 
In fact, it is not necessary that these strategies be deployed in a specific order or proportion 
for an educational model to be part of the standard approach. Jason Baehr, for instance, 
considers exposure to exemplars as a subcomponent of direct instruction (see 2015: 308) 
yet confers on it a relevant role because it constitutes the most straightforward way to 
acquaint children with the virtues.iii In contrast, exemplarists give a prime role to virtuous 
exemplars, through which the admiration-reflection-emulation dynamic activates, thereby 
allowing children to improve their understanding of moral concepts and develop virtuous 
habits. In this account, the other strategies work as auxiliary strategies, in that they support 
the exemplarist process by fulfilling a function the dynamic is not in itself suitable to 
perform.  
In particular, in a plausible classroom setting—namely, one that has already been 
tested in primary schoolsiv—young students are presented with exemplary stories and are 
given the opportunity to work together on understanding the stories’ meaning and 
implications for their own lives. Within this framework, direct instruction merely provides 
the children with basic vocabulary about the character traits they could find in the 
exemplars under consideration. It is important that the exemplar-based model makes 
minimal use of this strategy, for this way it reduces the risks of being accused of being 
indoctrinatory. Practicing virtuous behaviour is key to an exemplarist educational process 
in that it supports the stage of emulation by providing suitable opportunities for the 
students to exercise the virtues within the school setting. There is no official handbook for 
how to create these opportunities. Rather, the exemplarist account is compatible with 
several available options for the students to imitate an exemplar’s behaviour. These include 
small-group activities within the classroom aimed at creating apt conditions for the 
students to exercise some virtues (Baehr 2015: 379), educative dialogues in the class 
(Kristjánsson 2015: §7), and opportunities for building character in the assignments (Carr 
and Harrison 2015: 130–33). 
The limited-applicability problem, as we consider it here following Tanesini’s 
considerations (2016), pinpoints a general limitation of the standard strategies, namely that 
they only apply to those circumstances in which the students lack nonvirtuous attitudes 
(2016: 524). In particular, she argues that exposure to exemplars works only with children 
already disposed to be emotionally moved by exemplary stories and to be motivated to 
emulate an exemplar’s behaviour (525). In contrast, this strategy would be detrimental for 
children who ‘possess a defensive self-esteem and thus are predisposed toward haughtiness 
and arrogance’ (525) and those who ‘suffer from self-abasing and obsequious tendencies’ 
(526). The former would overestimate the traits they think they have in common with the 
exemplar and would disregard what separates them from the exemplar, thereby deluding 
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themselves into thinking they are closer to virtue than in fact they are. For the latter, 
encountering a virtuous exemplar would amount to further evidence that they are too far 
away from achieving the virtues, thereby strengthening their negative self-assessment.  
It is worth pointing out that Tanesini’s objection is meant to address education for 
intellectual virtues more than moral virtues. This remark helps us explain why she suggests 
that a promising approach to dealing with such children amounts to self-affirmation 
techniques involving exercises through which they can reflect on the attributes that define 
them. For these techniques could reduce ‘the defensiveness of the arrogant and enhance 
the explicit self-esteem of the self-abased’ (526). Evidently, the objection applies to the 
domain of moral education too, for the effect of exposing the aforementioned categories 
of students to exemplars is the same even when the exemplars in questions are morally 
rather than intellectually virtuous.  
Proponents of an exemplar-based educational model might take Tanesini’s point and 
emphasize that their view need not exclude self-affirmation techniques as an auxiliary 
strategy to be deployed with arrogant or self-abasing children. Yet whenever children lack 
tendencies to vices, exposing them to moral exemplars is likely to be more fruitful as an 
educational method since it can create an opportunity for many students to undertake a 
process of virtue formation at the same time through the admiration-reflection-imitation 
dynamic. On careful look, exemplarists can do more. Following Zagzebski (2017: 25), they 
can refine their educational approach by arguing that exemplarism can be effective insofar 
as the virtuous model an educator proposes to the children fits the stage of moral 
development they are at. In particular, Han et al. have shown that “stories of attainable and 
relevant moral exemplars […] more effectively promoted students’ service engagement” 
(2017:11) compared with those of historic models. Attainable exemplars provide the 
students with the perception that they can emulate the model without excessive effort, 
while relevant exemplars belong to the students’ environment (e.g., family, school, sports 
team, or community), thereby exercising their virtues in situations familiar to the children.  
One might think the proposed kinds of exemplars go against the spirit of an 
exemplarist approach, which should focus on authentically exceptional figures. However, 
since the exemplarist dynamic purports to allow us to imitate moral exemplars, as principle 
(ii) suggests, it becomes crucial to ensure that the proposed models elicit not only our 
admiration, but also the desire to emulate their behaviour, as suggested by (iii). Attainable 
and relevant models may well fall within the set of moral exemplars an exemplarist 
educational account can deploy, for they fare morally better than we do, but in such a way 
that we do not lose the perception that we can imitate them, and the desire to do so.  
How can attainable and relevant models help the exemplarist address Tanesini’s 
objection? I shall contend that interacting with these exemplars can have positive 
consequences on both arrogant and self-abased students. In both cases, the possibility for 
the exemplarist to propose a convincing strategy requires a tailored approach, in that the 
teacher might have to choose different exemplars as suitable for different students. This 
complicates the educational model from a practical standpoint, but it does not undermine 
its plausibility and feasibility.  
As regards arrogant students, the most promising situation would be one in which the 
student shares some trait with a virtuous exemplar who also displays humility. In this case, 
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though arrogance leads the child to think of themselves as similar to the exemplar, it would 
be possible for them to notice that in several ordinary circumstances the exemplar adopts 
humble behaviours, that is, acts differently than the child would do. The more relevant an 
humble exemplar is to the child—i.e., the closer they are to a student’s daily life—the easier 
it is that the child experiences some dissonance between what they think they share with an 
exemplar and the model’s actual behaviour. In contrast, it is likely that the student would 
not be moved by a humble exemplar encountered through a narrative, in that the different 
contexts they live in would make it harder for the arrogant child to be struck by the 
exemplar’s humility and hence to develop a desire to emulate them.  
As regards self-abasing students, the prospects of the proposed exemplarist’s solution 
are threatened by the fact that self-abasement negatively affects a child’s perception of what 
is attainable. In such a scenario, it is key to present students with ordinary exemplars—that is, 
with relevant, but also morally imperfect models. For the possibility of seeing them at work 
in situations familiar to the children and acknowledging both their virtuousness and their 
flaws would help self-abasing students counteract the distorted perception of the distance 
between themselves and the exemplar, and develop a motivation to reduce such distance by 
emulating their behaviour. 
Nothing I have maintained so far is meant to provide knock-down arguments on 
behalf of the exemplarists. Rather, I have attempted to show how an exemplar-based 
account of moral education can address the limited-applicability problem and make room 
for auxiliary strategies to foster moral education in less-than-ideal circumstances. In the 
next section, we shall evaluate whether an exemplar-based account can refute the 
accusation of indoctrinating children.  
 
 
3. THE PROBLEM OF INDOCTRINATION 
 
It is a shared assumption of most approaches to moral education that indoctrinatory 
educational strategies should be avoided because they inhibit children’s capacity for moral 
reflection and thereby deprive them of the necessary abilities to evaluate the goodness of 
their moral conduct. However, assessing whether an educational model successfully avoids 
the charge of indoctrination is a complicated matter. For one thing, the solution to the 
problem of indoctrination substantially depends on what it takes for an educational 
approach to be indoctrinatory, and that is a highly disputed issue. For another, accounts of 
moral education are generally accused of being indoctrinatory on the grounds that they care 
about helping children act well in the moral domain, form morally appropriate beliefs, and 
develop the appropriate emotional response to morally relevant situations yet overlook the 
importance of fostering children’s autonomy (e.g., Siegel 2018: §6). In this section, after a 
brief reconstruction of these issues, I argue that an exemplar-based account can avoid the 
charge of indoctrination. The following considerations support the thesis that human 
flourishing requires not only education for moral virtues, but also, and more importantly, 
education for autonomy and thus for intellectual virtues.  
Let us consider the two issues affecting the solution to the problem of indoctrination 
in accounts of moral education. The first issue concerns the notion of indoctrination: rival 
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accounts propose different necessary conditions for a practice to be a form of 
indoctrination. Some hold that indoctrination lies in the methods an educator deploys—
namely, in strategies that do not help students to develop their capacity to reason (e.g., 
Copp 2016; Merry 2005). Others think indoctrination requires teaching of doctrines or 
false beliefs (e.g., Flew 1972). A third position encompasses those who endorse an 
intention-based account according to which an educator indoctrinates the students insofar 
as he or she aims at ensuring that students believe something regardless of the evidence 
(e.g., Snook 1972). As Callan and Arena (2009) and Taylor (2017) have shown, all these 
views have problems. Thus, following those scholars, in this paper I endorse an outcome-
based account that charges with indoctrination educators whose teaching strategies foster 
close-mindedness in their students. I cannot offer an argument in support of my choice 
here, but a detailed analysis of this account, its limits, and its advantages over rival positions 
can be found in the works just cited. For the purposes of this section, let us assume that for 
an educational practice to be indoctrinatory it has to have a tendency to produce closed-
minded individuals.  
The second issue pertains to the aims of moral education, some of which, at first 
glance, might seem indoctrinatory. For example, an adaptationalist approach to moral 
education aims at equipping children with the values, beliefs, and practices key to living 
within their community or society. This approach has been accused of indoctrinating 
students because causing students to develop pro-social behaviours—that is, having them do 
so closed-mindedly—is compatible with its main goal (Carr 1983: 41–42). The standard 
approach to virtue formation looks better equipped to avoid this problem, in that for the 
students to develop a virtue, it is necessary that they exercise their free reason in the form 
of phronesis. Nonetheless, it may still look problematic to concede that some adult or 
community decides what counts as a virtue on behalf of the young and fosters their 
acquisition of these character traits. As Siegel points out, these values ‘will have been 
imposed on students from without, rather than having been embraced from within, on the 
basis of the students’ own independent judgment’ (2018: 86). Any approach to moral 
education that ‘fails to foster students’ ability to think critically about morality’ turns out to 
be indoctrinatory, in that ‘whatever beliefs it imparts, actions it encourages, habits or 
sentiments it fosters, etc., students so educated will be unable to determine for themselves 
the worthiness or otherwise of those very beliefs, actions, habits, and so on’ (85–86).  
In order to clarify the force of the problem of indoctrination, it is helpful distinguish 
two main stages of moral education. In the first stage, young children have not developed 
their capacity for reflection on moral issues yet and therefore lack autonomy. Thus, 
presenting them with rival views on moral values and attempting to foster value pluralism 
amount to neither a promising educational strategy nor a good remedy against 
indoctrination, for the students lack the resources to grasp reasons in favour and against 
the various views. As some have recently argued, at this stage it is fundamental to 
undertake processes of moral formation—that is, attempts ‘to bring it about that children 
subscribe to certain moral standards’ (Hand 2014: 526)—or moral socialization, which 
amounts to teaching children to ‘work cooperatively and to have certain important ‘pro-
social’ or morally acceptable attitudes’ (Copp 2016: 155). Put simply, the first goal of moral 
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education is to teach children to tell the truth, be respectful of other people, handle 
emotions, avoid cheating or bullying attitudes, and so on.  
One might suspect that this is in fact an indoctrinatory strategy, in that it inculcates 
values in someone who is unable to decide whether they want to endorse those values. On 
closer look, this kind of moral instruction need not be indoctrinatory, in that it ‘is not 
matter of teaching children to have certain beliefs’ (156); rather, it provides children with a 
basic framework for social interactions and it does not prevent them from developing 
reflection skills and critical thinking in due course (Merry 2005: 400). In other words, good 
educators can undertake moral formation without indoctrinating the children if they avoid 
fostering close-minded attitudes about other approaches and opinions in their students. 
The second stage of moral education consists in helping older children understand and 
think critically about controversial moral issues (Copp 2016: 155), but also about the very 
same values they have learned in the first stage. Copp calls this process propositional moral 
education to show that the reflective skills students develop within this stage allow them to 
acquire propositional moral content. Hand terms it moral inquiry, a stage in which students 
are invited to ‘consider what reasons there might be for holding themselves and each other 
to standards of conduct’ (2014: 526). Indoctrination might be less of a problem in this 
stage than it is in the first. For insofar as an educator teaches students to deploy their 
conceptual apparatus to form their own judgment about moral issues, this strategy helps 
them strengthen their autonomy and develop critical thinking.  
The important question we need to answer is whether an exemplar-based account of 
moral education runs the risk of indoctrinating the young. I anticipated earlier that my 
answer would be negative, meaning that this account can achieve its goals without adopting 
indoctrinatory strategies. The strategy I shall adopt to argue for this thesis requires 
distinguishing the case of older students from the condition of younger children. In the 
case of students that are already of the appropriate age to reason about moral exemplarity 
and virtue, there may be several ways an educator can stimulate these children to critical 
reflection, but a potentially effective strategy has been recently proposed by Yousra 
Osman. In the ‘Inspire’ phase of her pilot study examining a role-modelling character-
education project, she provided primary school students aged eleven to twelve with stories 
of ordinary exemplars and in order to encourage critical thinking asked them, as a first task 
of the project, to ‘brainstorm what virtues they think the role model presents before the 
teacher defines them’ (2019: xxx). An important advantage of this solution is that it allows 
children to form their own judgments before getting acquainted with the teacher’s 
definition of a virtue, thereby reducing the possibility that instruction turns out to be 
indoctrinatory. Obviously, this solution can only apply to students who are already able to 
engage in critical reflection and moral inquiry; thus, exemplarists still need to explain how 
they manage to educate younger children to virtue without indoctrinating them.  
In the case of younger students, an exemplarist reply to the objection of indoctrination 
needs to address both the stage of moral socialization and the stage of moral inquiry. As 
regards the former, the exemplar-based account incurs a smaller risk of indoctrinating the 
students than other models of virtue formation in that it reduces the amount of direct 
instruction to mere provision of minimum vocabulary for the students to understand virtue 
terms. In this approach, most moral socialization amounts to presenting children with 
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ordinary exemplars to admire and emulate rather than with rules to follow and actions to 
perform over and over on the grounds that this is what good children do.  
A more serious concern arises as soon as young students are able to grasp moral 
propositional content and therefore undertake moral inquiry. One might in fact think the 
proponent of an exemplar-based model is committed to giving up on the exemplarist 
dynamic in the stage of moral inquiry and endorsing another approach, one that fosters 
autonomy and critical thinking. I shall resist this idea and show that critical thinking can be 
fostered through the exemplarist dynamic. My argument involves two steps: first, I shall 
highlight that the exemplarist dynamic requires conscientious reflection; then, I shall argue 
that the exemplarist dynamic itself can foster the necessary skills that help reflection and 
allow students to develop critical thinking. 
The first step is quite straightforward. As we have seen in section 1, developing and 
deploying conscientious reflection in evaluating an exemplar’s admirability and virtuousness 
is a necessary requirement of the exemplarist dynamic. Inculcating moral values through 
admiration and imitation of virtuous exemplars may provide young children with pro-social 
attitudes, but the overall effectiveness of the approach rests on the students’ 
conscientiousness and thus on their critical-thinking skills. Hence, the important question 
becomes: how can critical thinking be developed in an exemplar-based educational 
approach? The answer I propose is that in the stage of moral inquiry, the educator helps 
children develop the necessary conceptual resources to undertake their own moral 
assessments, namely intellectual virtues, through the exemplarist dynamic. In principle, 
there seems to be no reason why the exemplar-based model should not apply to intellectual 
character traits. As Zagzebski suggests, ‘Epistemic admiration plays an important role in 
acquiring intellectual virtues.… We find certain persons and certain epistemic behaviors 
admirable and we learn to think critically and carefully, to be open-minded, intellectually 
fair, and persevering by imitating persons who have those traits’ (2012: 90). 
The plausibility of this approach to moral inquiry rests on two important points, 
namely whether intellectual virtues can provide children with critical thinking and whether 
providing intellectual-virtue formation via an exemplar-based method avoids the problem 
of indoctrination. I suggest we can respond to both questions in the affirmative. As regards 
the former question, on Siegel’s view critical thinking includes two components: the 
reason-assessment component (henceforth RAC), involving skills and abilities to evaluate 
the epistemic strength of reasons for an action, a belief, or a judgment, and the critical-
spirit component (henceforth CSC), involving dispositions, habits, and character traits that 
allow one to be disposed to reason assessment and be guided by it in action, belief, and 
judgment (e.g., 2018: 21). Siegel admits that intellectual virtues feature in the constituents 
of CSC, in that they are dispositions to obtain epistemic goods, including those concerning 
the development of a critical spirit. Jason Baehr has recently shown that for two reasons 
intellectual virtues also require that RAC be satisfied. First, possessing intellectual virtues 
requires that the subject be able to judge when to engage in activities relevant for that 
virtue. For example, an open-minded person has the competence to assess reasons in 
favour of and against considering a competing standpoint. Second, having intellectual 
virtues requires that the subject aptly and successfully exert the intellectual activity 
characteristic of that virtue. For example, an intellectually careful individual forms correct 
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epistemic judgments, while an intellectually courageous one makes their voice heard in the 
appropriate circumstances (2019). Whatever are the necessary intellectual virtues to possess 
for one to display critical-thinking skills, we can conclude that fostering these character 
traits puts students in a good position to become critical thinkers.  
If this is the case, then a positive answer to the second question follows from this 
point. For educating the students for open-mindedness, thoroughness, inquisitiveness, and 
so on amounts to a powerful remedy against indoctrination. Thus, the only way an 
educational approach that successfully promotes critical thinking can be indoctrinatory is 
by indoctrinating children in critical thinking and hence in the intellectual virtues. But as we 
have already argued, an exemplar-based educational model incurs a limited risk of being 
indoctrinatory because the exemplarist dynamic allows children to develop the virtues in a 
way that suits their emotional and cognitive needs.  
It goes without saying that even intellectual-virtues formation through an exemplar-
based approach requires that an educator support the exemplarist dynamic with auxiliary 
strategies providing opportunities for the students to understand how intellectual virtues 
concretely work as well as to practice virtuous behaviour. Baehr has offered insightful 
examples of how we can help children develop virtuous habits in classroom settings. 
Besides thinking of activities that could allow small groups of students to cooperate in a 
collective inquiry (that is, a fruitful context in which a lot of opportunities for exercising 
intellectual virtues arise), an educator can implement ‘thinking routines’ in the classroom’s 
ordinary activities—that is, ‘a pedagogical tool for facilitating the practice of intellectual 
virtues’ (2015: 380). Among the routines are the ‘What Makes You Say That?’ routine and 
the ‘Circle of Viewpoints’ one. The former helps children strengthen virtues of self-
reflection—such as intellectual carefulness, thoroughness, and intellectual humility—by 
giving the teacher and the classmates the opportunity to address this question to a student 
who is talking. The latter consists in exploring different perspectives on a given subject 
matter with the goals of developing open-mindedness and attaining a deep understanding 
of the issue at stake.  
Let us take stock and summarize how we have answered the main question raised in 
this section, namely whether an exemplar-based account of moral education indoctrinates 
young students. The answer included two main situations, namely one in which an educator 
undertakes a process of moral education with children able to grasp moral concepts and 
another in which students are unable to do so because of their young age. In the first case, 
an educator who fosters moral virtues following the exemplarist dynamic can avoid the 
charge of indoctrination by giving the necessary attention to the reflection phase of the 
process—that is, by making sure the dynamic does not lead students to develop close-
minded attitudes towards people with different viewpoints or alternative education 
backgrounds. In the second case, an educator should first undertake a process of moral 
formation aimed at increasing the students’ familiarity with virtuous behaviour and the 
vocabulary of virtue and later propose a stage of moral inquiry, in which students are led to 
form moral judgments by being exposed to exemplars of intellectual virtues and being 
offered opportunities to develop and practice critical thinking. In addition to both 
situations, an educator can stimulate practice of virtuous behaviour in the students by 
proposing tools and activities such as the ones suggested by Baehr. This way, the risk of 
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indoctrinating them is minimal because fostering critical thinking amounts to helping 
children develop those skills that counteract the formation of close-minded attitudes. Thus, 
we can conclude that an exemplar-based account of moral education has the resources to 
provide moral-virtue formation without being indoctrinatory.  
 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
The analysis I pursued in this paper was meant to assess the potential of an exemplar-based 
account of moral education within the current debate in moral education. Because of 
length constraints, I had to limit my inquiry to two specific issues, which I called the 
limited-applicability problem and the problem of indoctrination. I attempted to show how 
an exemplarist model can address both issues without giving up on its core educational 
strategy, namely the exemplarist dynamic. More could be said—in fact, should be said—
about the educational potential of this approach, for example regarding the role of teachers 
as role models (e.g., Tuninetti 2018), the effectiveness of nudging children through 
narratives (e.g., Engelen et al. 2018) and educating them to intellectual virtue through 
exemplars, and the educational function of negative or vicious exemplars.v I wish further 
papers will soon explore these and other issues relevant for an exemplarist approach to 
moral education, and I hope this paper has contributed to the growing debate.vi 
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